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379 
JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE POST-
MILLER: THE LONG, TREACHEROUS ROAD 
TOWARDS A CATEGORICAL RULE 
I. INTRODUCING THE “NEW” EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
For the better part of a decade, life without the possibility of parole 
(“LWOP”) has been the United States’ harshest constitutional penalty for 
juvenile crimes.
1
 Recently, the Supreme Court has begun to subject 
juvenile LWOP sentences to significant Eighth Amendment scrutiny.
2
 In 
Graham v. Florida,
3
 the Court held that imposing LWOP for juvenile acts 
not amounting to homicide violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause.
4
 Juveniles, Justice Kennedy explained, “are less deserving of the 
most severe punishments” because the realities of childhood and lack of 
maturity in adolescence make them categorically less culpable than adults 
for the same conduct.
5
 
Notwithstanding its seemingly universal language about juvenile 
culpability, Graham’s insistence on distinguishing between homicide and 
non-homicide crimes meant that, by the summer of 2012, there were still 
roughly 2,500 prisoners in the United States serving LWOP for homicides 
they committed as juveniles.
6
 Miller v. Alabama,
7
 decided in June 2012, 
gave some of these prisoners a measure of hope. In Miller, the Court 
 
 
 1. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575, 578 (2005) (finding death to be categorically 
cruel and unusual punishment when meted out on offenders who committed their crimes as juveniles); 
see also infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the Court’s opinion in Roper). 
 2. This scrutiny fits into the larger trend of giving youth greater constitutional salience in 
criminal proceedings. For example, the court recently held that a suspect’s age is relevant to the 
objective custody analysis under Miranda v. Arizona. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 
(2011). So long as police know, or should know, that the suspect is a juvenile, courts must now 
consider the suspect’s age when determining whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave. Id. 
at 2402–03, 2406. In other words, J.D.B. creates what some have called a reasonable juvenile standard. 
E.g. Hillary B. Farber, J.D.B. v. North Carolina: Ushering in a New “Age” of Custody Analysis Under 
Miranda, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 117, 144 (2011); Marsha Levick, J.D.B. v. North Carolina: The U.S. 
Supreme Court Heralds the Emergence of the “Reasonable Juvenile” in American Criminal Law, 89 
CRIM. L. REP. 753, 753 (2011). In reaching its “commonsense” holding in J.D.B., the Court relied 
upon the same core differences between juveniles and adults that it has cited in its recent juvenile 
sentencing cases. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403. See infra text accompanying notes 76–80 (discussing the 
Court’s treatment of these differences in its juvenile sentencing opinions). 
 3. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). Graham is scheduled for publication at 560 U.S. 48. 
 4. Id. at 2034. 
 5. Id. at 2026. 
 6. Melinda Tuhus, Supreme Court Ruling Bars Mandatory Life Sentences for Juveniles, 
BETWEEN THE LINES (July 4, 2012), http://btlonline.org/2012/seg/120713bf-btl-mauer.html (interviewing 
Marc Mauer, Executive Director of the Sentencing Project). 
 7. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
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announced “children are different”8 and, consequently, the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits mandatory LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders.
9
 
Writing for a 5–4 majority, Justice Kagan drew a direct analogy between 
juvenile LWOP and the death penalty. Justice Kagan concluded that 
juvenile LWOP sentences, like death sentences, may not be imposed 
without an individualized sentencing determination.
10
 
In the wake of Miller and Graham, some commentators have suggested 
that we now live under a “new” Eighth Amendment,11 one where judicial 
scrutiny has finally slipped the shackles of the “death is different” doctrine 
and where proportionality could have serious teeth in non-capital cases.
12
 
Certainly, these cases give cause for some optimism.
13
 Prior to Graham, 
the Supreme Court had never categorically invalidated a sentence other 
than death under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
14
 In just over 
two years, the Court did it twice.
15
 
 
 
 8. Id. at 2470. 
 9. See id. at 2469. 
 10. Id. at 2463, 2466–67; cf. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303–05 (1976) (plurality 
opinion) (finding that constitutional imposition of the death penalty requires “particularized 
consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant”). 
 11. E.g., Douglas A. Berman, Graham and Miller and the Eighth Amendment’s Uncertain 
Future, 27 CRIM. JUST., Winter 2013, at 19, 25. 
 12. Professor Berman contends that “the Court’s decision in [Miller and Graham] to start 
applying its broadest Eighth Amendment doctrines to noncapital sentences changes both the playing 
field and the stakes for constitutional review of individual sentencing outcomes and state punishment 
policies.” Id. at 23. See also Julia L. Torti, Note, Accounting for Punishment in Proportionality 
Review, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1915 (2013) (“Graham and Miller may indicate that a more probing 
analysis of the severity of punishments is permissible or even encouraged.”); cf. Craig S. Lerner, 
Sentenced to Confusion: Miller v. Alabama and the Coming Wave of Eighth Amendment Cases, 20 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 25, 39 (2012) (“The larger question raised by Graham and Miller is whether the 
Court, having twice invalidated noncapital sentences, is prepared to embark upon an invigorated 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence outside the juvenile context.”). 
 13. This Note accepts that the categorical differences between juveniles and adults, including 
comparatively diminished culpability and greater capacity for reform, require categorically different 
sentencing rules for juveniles and, thus, endorses wholesale elimination of juvenile LWOP from the 
American sentencing lexicon. 
 14. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2046 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“For the first 
time in its history, the Court declares an entire class of offenders immune from a noncapital sentence 
using the categorical approach it previously reserved for death penalty cases alone.”); cf. discussion 
infra note 40 (describing the historical difficulty of proving that a term of incarceration violates the 
Eighth Amendment under the “grossly disproportionate” standard). 
 15. One interpretation of Miller is that it erected a categorical bar against mandatory juvenile 
LWOP sentences. One could also interpret the opinion to explain where an otherwise permissible 
sentence (juvenile LWOP) is procedurally defective (when it is mandatory). This distinction is not 
trivial and lies near the heart of the debate over whether Miller’s holding should apply retroactively. 
See discussion infra note 224 (discussing the state of the retroactivity debate); see also Molly F. 
Martinson, Negotiating Miller Madness: Why North Carolina Gets Juvenile Resentencing Right While 
Other States Drop the Ball, 91 N.C. L. REV. 2179, 2190–97 (2013) (examining arguments for and 
against Miller retroactivity). 
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At the same time, Miller’s reasoning should give pause to those 
seeking to eradicate juvenile LWOP entirely and to bring the United States 
in line with international standards of juvenile justice. Like Graham, 
Miller presented a chance for the Court to unveil the blanket prohibition 
on juvenile LWOP many advocates seek. And, again, it became a chance 
not taken.
16
 Instead, the Miller Court stepped away from the traditional 
Eighth Amendment decency analysis, entirely neglected the international 
community, and lashed juvenile LWOP to the death-penalty mast. In so 
doing, the Court signaled that a comprehensive Eighth Amendment bar 
against all juvenile LWOP sentences is still a long way off. 
This Note attempts to situate Miller within the Court’s recent juvenile 
sentencing jurisprudence and predict its trajectory. Part II tells a 
condensed story of United States juvenile sentencing law and traces its 
customary decency analysis through the Court’s recent decisions. Part III 
surveys the Miller decision and analyzes its reasoning. Part IV explores 
Miller’s wholesale omission of international law and opinion, arguing that 
the Court could have (and perhaps should have) relied upon an emerging 
jus cogens norm against juvenile LWOP to strike down all such sentences. 
Finally, Part V discusses the possible ramifications of Miller’s holding and 
reasoning for efforts to abolish juvenile LWOP. This Note reluctantly 
concludes that advocates may want to devote less time and energy to the 
constitutional litigation that has served them so well up to this point.  
 
 
 16. Since Graham was decided in 2010, much ink has been spilled calling for the Court to strike 
down all juvenile LWOP sentences. See generally Mary Berkheiser, Developmental Detour: How the 
Minimalism of Miller v. Alabama Led the Court’s “Kids are Different” Eighth Amendment 
Jurisprudence Down a Blind Alley, 46 AKRON L. REV. 489, 491 (2013) (castigating the Miller Court 
for failing “to rule categorically that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of life without 
parole on a juvenile regardless of the crime”); Marina Ann Magnuson, Taking Lives: How the United 
States has Violated the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights by Sentencing Juveniles to 
Life Without Parole, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 163, 188–89 (2010); Natalie Pifer, Note, Is Life 
the Same as Death?: Implications of Graham v. Florida, Roper v. Simmons, and Atkins v. Virginia on 
Life Without Parole Sentences for Juvenile and Mentally Retarded Offenders, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1495, 1512 (2010); Lisa S. Yun, Note, The United States Stands Alone: An International Consensus 
Against Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentences, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 727, 743 (2011). As the 
face of some of these articles suggests, widespread international opposition to the United States’ 
punishment of its youths has been a major arguing point. Even after Miller, U.S. juvenile sentencing 
law is internationally backwards—the United States remains one of only two countries on earth that 
has not officially denounced juvenile LWOP on the world stage. See text accompanying infra note 159 
(discussing the widespread ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. SENTENCING JUVENILES IN AMERICA: AN ABRIDGED HISTORY 
To discuss the development of juvenile sentencing in the United States 
it is necessary to have a two-part conversation. The first part deals with 
decisions that occur before any criminal charges are filed, and asks how 
states can escape the juvenile justice systems they created and can impose 
adult penalties on juvenile offenders. The second part deals with how the 
courts evaluate the constitutionality of juvenile sentences after sentencing. 
A. The Rise and Ramifications of Juvenile Courts 
For roughly the first half of the nation’s history, there was no separate 
system of juvenile justice in the United States.
17
 Rather, the states 
universally tried children and teens in the same courts as adults and 
theoretically exposed them to the same penalties.
18
 According to Craig S. 
Lerner, however, children under fourteen were often shielded from 
criminal liability by a rebuttable presumption that they lacked the capacity 
to act with the requisite mens rea.
19
 Prosecutors could overcome the 
presumption with a showing of sufficient malice, applying the Latin 
maxim malitia supplet ætatem
20
 (literally, “malice supplies age”21). The 
question of what weight to give to the offender’s youth was determined by 
the sentencer on a case-by-case basis.
22
 
With the advent of juvenile courts, came development of distinct 
juvenile punishment. Some punishments, such as detention in juvenile 
facilities, are analogous to adult criminal penalties.
23
 Many juvenile courts, 
however, sentence juveniles with kid gloves, employing creative 
 
 
 17. Juvenile courts did not exist until 1899, when the first one sprang up in the Chicago area. 
SAMUEL DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, § 1:1 (2012). Initially, these new courts were unique, non-
adversary fora. See id. § 1:2. In the last fifty years, however, the Supreme Court has insisted that 
juvenile systems adhere to certain principles of due process, imposing some of the “trappings of 
[adult] criminal process” on the juvenile courts. Id. § 1:3. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) 
(requiring notice of charges, the right to counsel, and the right to confront and cross-examine in 
juvenile proceedings). 
 18. See Craig S. Lerner, Juvenile Criminal Responsibility: Can Malice Supply the Want of 
Years?, 86 TUL. L. REV. 309, 318–19 (2011) (noting that, while infrequent, early American courts 
occasionally sentenced juveniles to death). 
 19. See id. at 317–18. 
 20. See id.  
 21. William Whitaker, Malitia Supplet Aetatem, WORDS, http://www.archives.nd.edu/cgi-bin/ 
words.exe?malitia+supplet+ aetatem (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). 
 22. See Lerner, supra note 18, at 316. 
 23. See DAVIS, supra note 17, § 7:3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss2/3
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alternatives to institutional detention, such as: group therapy,
24
 halfway 
houses,
25
 and limiting the ability of the delinquent juvenile to associate 
with certain persons.
26
 Philosophical opposition to lengthy detention is so 
strong that when courts decide to commit an offender to a juvenile 
institution, the Uniform Juvenile Court Act
27
 limits individual terms to two 
years, renewable only after a hearing.
28
  
Following the explosion of juvenile, violent crime rates in the 1980s 
and 1990s, almost all states sought to impose harsher criminal penalties on 
exceptionally violent youths.
29
 The response to these so-called 
“superpredators”30 was a proliferation of statutes permitting them to be 
prosecuted as adults.
31
 While these state laws operate in different ways,
32
 
they all act to divest juvenile courts of jurisdiction and expose youths to 
adult sentencing schemes
33
 with many states adopting mandatory 
 
 
 24. See id.; cf. Solomon Moore, Missouri System Treats Juvenile Offenders With Lighter Hand, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2009, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/us/27juvenile 
.html (“Some states have worked at the county level to avoid confinement altogether, keeping youths 
in their communities while they receive rehabilitative services.”). A practical advantage of alternative 
solutions to juvenile detention is, of course, reduced cost to the state. Id. 
 25. See DAVIS, supra note 17, § 7:3; cf. Moore, supra note 24 (discussing kinder, group-home 
facilities). 
 26. See DAVIS, supra note 17, § 7:3. This approach occasionally raises First Amendment issues. 
Id. 
 27. NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT 
(1968). 
 28. Id. § 36. 
 29. See Ethan Bronner, Sentencing Ruling Reflects Rethinking on Juvenile Justice, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 27, 2012, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/us/news-analysis-ruling-
reflects-rethinking-on-juvenile-justice.html. Elizabeth S. Scott calls the public reactions of this period 
“Moral Panics.” Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile Crime 
Regulation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535, 537 (2013). 
 30. E.g., Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has Regrets, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at A19. “Superpredators” were defined as “radically impulsive, brutally 
remorseless youngsters . . . who murder, assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join gun-
toting gangs and create serious communal disorders.” Id. 
 31. See Bronner, supra note 29, at A14. 
 32. Some provisions vest the decision about whether a youth will be tried as an adult wholly in 
the prosecutor handling the case. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 985.557(1)(a) (2011). The statute provides: 
“With respect to any child who was 14 or 15 years of age at the time the alleged offense was 
committed, the state attorney may file an information when in the state attorney’s judgment and 
discretion the public interest requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed.” Id. (emphasis 
added). The statute then enumerates offenses for which this discretion is granted, mostly offenses that 
involve violence or stealing. See id. Other statutory provisions designate offenses for which juveniles 
of a certain age must be tried as adults. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-204 (2012). Sometimes both of 
these provisions appear in the same statute. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 985.557(1)(b). 
 33. In a recent report, the Attorney General’s National Task Force on Children Exposed to 
Violence released a series of recommendations which, inter alia, opposed both of these practices. See 
ATT’Y GEN.’S NAT’L TASK FORCE ON CHILDREN EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE, DEFENDING CHILDHOOD: 
PROTECT, HEAL, THRIVE (Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/defendingchildhood/ 
cev-rpt-full.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). The task force concluded: “Laws and regulations 
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sentencing around the same time as these jurisdictional statutes.
34
 Indeed, 
in many states it is still possible for juveniles charged with violent 
offenses to be mandatorily tried in adult court and to receive mandatory 
adult penalties.
35
 Permitting youths to ride this fast track to states’ harshest 
criminal penalties can pervert the entire concept of juvenile justice.
36
 
B. Evolving Standards of Decency 
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”37 The Court currently understands the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause to contain a “narrow proportionality principle.”38 That 
 
 
prosecuting [juvenile offenders] as adults in adult courts, incarcerating them as adults, and sentencing 
them to harsh punishments that ignore and diminish their capacity to grow must be replaced or 
abandoned.” Id. at 23. 
 34. See generally Philip Oliss, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, 
and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1852–53 (1995) (describing the proliferation 
of tough-on-crime mandatory sentencing schemes in the 1980s). 
 35. For example, in Alabama, a 16-year-old who commits an armed assault must be tried as an 
adult, ALA. CODE § 12-15-204(a)(3), and must be imprisoned for at least two years, ALA. CODE 
§ 13A-6-21 (2012); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-6 (2012). The circumstances simply do not matter. 
 36. Imposing adult criminal penalties on juvenile offenders often means sending juveniles to 
adult prisons, where they face disproportionate levels of abuse and psychological torment. See Andrea 
Wood, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Confining Juveniles with Adults after Graham and 
Miller, 61 EMORY L.J. 1445, 1450–58 (2012); cf. Children in Adult Prison, EQUAL JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE, http://eji.org/childrenprison (last visited Nov. 16, 2013) (describing the approach of many 
states to juvenile criminal punishment as “subject[ing] kids to further victimization and abuse” rather 
than responding to the “crisis and dysfunction that creates child delinquency”). 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 38. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). The notion of Eighth Amendment proportionality in Supreme Court case 
law dates at least to the early twentieth century. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) 
(accepting a “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to 
offense”). Weems considered a sentence under a Philippine statute of fifteen-years hard labor for 
falsifying a single government document. Id. at 357–58. 
 Whether, and to what extent, the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality principle has been 
the subject of heated debate. The Court’s originalist justices vehemently argue that no proportionality 
principle can exist because it would be inconsistent with the Framers’ understanding of what could 
constitute a cruel or unusual punishment. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2483 (2012) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Harmelin, 501 U.S at 965 (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.). The common 
refrain is that the clause considers only “methods of punishment.” E.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2011, 2044 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 979. In Harmelin, Justice Scalia 
claims that the Framers were quite familiar with the concept of proportionality in punishment and 
would have included the word if they intended for the Eighth Amendment to have such content. 
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 977.  
 By contrast, for the argument that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause contains a 
proportionality principle, and a broad one at that, see generally John F. Stinneford, Rethinking 
Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011). See 
also JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 224 (2011) (pointing out that 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss2/3
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is, not every sentence that seems excessively harsh qualifies as cruel and 
unusual. Traditionally, the Court has employed a bifurcated mode of 
proportionality analysis, applying much stricter rules for capital 
sentences—leading to the axiom, “death is different.”39 By contrast, when 
facing a term of incarceration, an offender must show that her sentence is 
“grossly disproportionate” to implicate Eighth Amendment protections.40  
In Trop v. Dulles,
41
 a plurality of the Court first announced the test for 
whether a death sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate—whether 
that sentence offends “the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”42 The relevant, evolving standards are 
those of the present.
43
 Present standards are demonstrated by objective 
evidence, to the greatest extent possible.
44
 To identify these standards, the 
Court developed a two-pronged mode of analysis for death penalty cases. 
First, the Court looks for evidence of national consensus against the 
punishment in domestic “legislative enactments and state practice.”45 In 
light of this evidence, the Court then makes “its own independent 
judgment whether the punishment in question violates the Constitution.”46 
 
 
judicial proportionality determinations would not have troubled the framers in the slightest, as they 
clearly included proportionality in the bail and fines portions of the Eighth Amendment). Additionally, 
Justice Stevens hails Chief Justice Roberts for breaking with his predecessors and acknowledging 
some form of Eighth Amendment proportionality. Id. at 221. 
 39. See generally Jeffrey Abramson, Death-is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the 
Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 117–19 (2004) (describing the elevated status of the death 
penalty in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence). Abramson compiles a list of the numerous 
occasions where the Court has used language resembling “death is different.” Id. at 117 n.1. 
 40. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000–01. Gross disproportionality has proved to be an exceedingly 
difficult standard to satisfy. See Lerner, supra note 18, at 311 (noting that Graham was the first time in 
nearly thirty years that the Court overturned a term-of-years sentence). 
 41. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 42. Id. at 101 (plurality opinion). This language was later adopted by the majority in Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Although often cited as part of the Court’s death penalty 
jurisprudence, Trop dealt with whether Congress could punish soldiers who desert during wartime by 
divesting them of their citizenship. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 102–03. 
 43. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (“The standard [for cruel and 
unusual punishment] remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society 
change.”) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Berger, C.J., dissenting); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (“A claim that punishment is excessive is judged . . . by those 
[standards] that currently prevail.”). Demonstrating the changeability of societal norms (or, more 
cynically, of the ideological composition of the Court), both Roper and Atkins used evolving standards 
of decency to abrogate cases that had applied the same test and found the punishments—death for 
juveniles and developmentally disabled offenders, respectively—permissible. See Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (reconsidering Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)); Atkins, 536 U.S. 
at 310 (reconsidering Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)). 
 44. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment), accord Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312. 
 45. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572). 
 46. Id. at 2022. A common criticism of “independent judgment” has been that it allows the 
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1. The Decline of Objective Evidence of National Consensus 
In recent years, the Court has applied “evolving standards of decency” 
to strike down more juvenile sentencing schemes. At the same time, it has 
encountered increasingly weak evidence of national consensus against 
those schemes, at least in terms of legislation. In Thompson v. 
Oklahoma,
47
 a late 1980s tough-on-crime boom case, the Court held that 
states may not execute juveniles for crimes committed before the offender 
turned sixteen.
48
 The Thompson Court reviewed a death sentence that was 
to be imposed on fifteen-year-old William Thompson for the murder of his 
brother-in-law.
49
 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens remarked, 
“there are differences which must be accommodated in determining the 
rights and duties of children as compared with those of adults.”50 Justice 
Stevens observed that states almost universally treat juveniles fifteen and 
younger differently than they treat adults.
51
 More directly, he found that no 
state that set a minimum age for death-penalty eligibility permitted it for 
juveniles younger than sixteen.
52
 
Fourteen years after Thompson, the Court decided Atkins v. Virginia,
53
 
and categorically banned the death penalty for developmentally disabled 
offenders.
54
 Donald Atkins, while legally an adult, had an IQ of fifty-
nine
55
 and possessed “the mental age of a child between the ages of 9 and 
12.”56 For objective legislative evidence, Atkins relied both on the raw 
number of states that forbade capital punishment for the developmentally 
 
 
majority justices to rely too heavily on their own subjective opinions. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s assessment of the current legislative judgment . . . more 
resembles a post hoc rationalization for the majority’s subjectively preferred result . . . .”); see also 
Lerner, supra note 18, at 330 (describing Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Graham). Lerner writes: 
“Perhaps sensing how perilous the argument from state practice is, Justice Kennedy breathes more 
easily as he leaves objective criteria of community standards for the subjective ones.” Id.  
 47. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 48. Id. at 830. 
 49. See id. at 819. 
 50. Id. at 823 (emphasis in original) (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 590–91 (1975)). 
 51. Justice Stevens notes: “In no State may a 15-year-old vote or serve on a jury. Further, in all 
but one State a 15-year-old may not drive with parental consent, and in all but four States a 15-year-
old may not marry without parental consent . . . [A]ll states have enacted legislation designating the 
maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction at no less than 16.” Id. at 824 (footnotes omitted). 
 52. Id. at 829. 
 53. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 54. See id. at 321. 
 55. Id. at 309. 
 56. Id. at 310 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 534 S.E.2d 312, 323 (2000) (Hassell, J., dissenting)). 
Atkins’ developmental disability status was disputed at trial, the government instead contending that 
Atkins suffered from antisocial personality disorder, id. at 309, or, in layman’s parlance, that Atkins 
was a sociopath. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss2/3
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disabled, and the rapidly expanding list of states moving their laws in that 
direction.
57
 In total, thirty-two states and the federal government refused to 
execute developmentally disabled offenders at that time,
58
 seventeen states 
having adopted that policy after 1990.
59
 Moreover, “even in those States 
that allow the execution of mentally retarded offenders,” the Court noted, 
“the practice is uncommon.”60 
In Roper v. Simmons,
61
 the Court categorically eliminated the juvenile 
death penalty.
62
 To justify its decision, the majority relied on a legislative 
consensus quantitatively resembling Atkins but lacking clear, recent 
movement towards abolition.
63
 Justice Kennedy summarized the evidence: 
“30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty, comprising 12 that have 
rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but, by express 
provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach.”64 
Again, the majority took note of state practices, observing that although 
twenty states permitted the juvenile death penalty at the time, only three 
had actually executed a juvenile in the preceding decade.
65
 
Five years after Roper, the Court decided Graham v. Florida,
66
 and the 
majority applied a death-penalty decency analysis to eliminate juvenile 
LWOP for non-homicide crimes.
67
 Graham involved an offender 
sentenced to spend his life behind bars for an armed burglary committed 
when he was sixteen.
68
 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy 
acknowledged that thirty-eight jurisdictions and the federal government 
allowed LWOP for some juvenile offenses.
69
 Undeterred, Justice Kennedy 
 
 
 57. See id. at 313–15. 
 58. See id. Of those thirty-two states, thirteen banned the death penalty entirely, and nineteen 
specifically exempted the developmentally disabled from their death penalty statutes. Id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. Id. at 316. 
 61. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 62. Id. at 574. 
 63. Cf. id. at 612 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia remarks: “Now, the Court says a 
legislative change in four states is ‘significant’ enough to trigger a constitutional prohibition.” Id. 
 64. Id. at 564. 
 65. See id. at 564–65. 
 66. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 67. Id. at 2034. 
 68. Id. at 2020. The procedure of the case is a little muddled. At sixteen, Terrence Graham 
entered into a plea bargain at trial, whereby Graham received a three-year probation term in exchange 
for no adjudication of guilt. Id. at 2018. The next year, Graham was implicated, but never formally 
charged, in connection with a violent home invasion. Id. at 2018–19. Graham returned to court for 
violating his parole, where a new judge defied the recommendations of all parties involved and 
imposed the harshest punishment permitted under Florida law for the first robbery. Id. at 2019–20. 
 69. Id. at 2023. 
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maintained: “There are measures of consensus other than legislation.”70 
Turning to state practice, he discovered that all offenders serving juvenile 
LWOP sentences for crimes other than homicide were incarcerated in 
eleven states, and more than half of them in Florida.
71
 Notably, Justice 
Kennedy found that laws permitting trial, as adults, do not evince 
legislative intent to expose juveniles to LWOP.
72
 
As the Court has afforded juveniles greater sentencing protections, the 
role legislative evidence of national consensus—once seen as absolutely 
pivotal
73—has precipitously declined. Gradually, the Court has inverted 
the decency calculus, emphasizing independent judgments rooted in 
medicine, social science, and penological theory. 
2. The Rise of Independent Judgments 
Within the Court’s two-pronged approach to the decency analysis, 
there is tension between the weight given to objective evidence of 
consensus and the Court’s independent judgment. Independent judgments 
do not need to follow in lockstep with national consensus evidence. 
Indeed, the Court’s independent judgment becomes more critical as signs 
of national consensus weaken. Indeed, the Court in Graham remarked: 
“Community consensus, while entitled to great weight, is not itself 
determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.”74 While 
acknowledging that both groups of evidence must be considered, the Court 
could hardly be clearer in its preference for its own independent 
judgment—even where little consensus exists to buttress it.75 To the 
Court’s credit, its rationales have been reasonable and remarkably 
consistent across its juvenile sentencing decisions. 
 
 
 70. Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 433 (2008)). 
 71. Id. at 2024. The Court bases its count on a combination of a study and its own research. The 
overall count was subject to debate. Craig S. Lerner points out that the Court relied on a potentially 
flawed study. See Lerner, supra note 18, at 329. Lerner also notes that “no one knows how rarely 
[juvenile LWOP] is imposed.” Id. at 330. 
 72. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2025. 
 73. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“[P]roportionality review by federal courts should be informed by 
objective factors to the maximum extent possible.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 74. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008)). 
Kennedy held that the death penalty could not be imposed when a homicide did not occur and was not 
intended, even when the victim was a child. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2646. Notably, in Graham, 
Justice Kennedy drew useful statements from his own words in Kennedy’s majority opinion. 
 75. A cynic might argue that the independent judgment has always been the prime consideration. 
Even in Thompson, the Court described objective indicators as “confirm[ing] our judgment.” 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988). 
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Much of the Court’s language discussing its independent judgment has 
come to focus on the mental, emotional, and behavioral differences 
between children and adults. Quoting earlier precedents, requiring youth 
as a mitigating factor in juvenile capital cases, the Thompson Court 
acknowledged: “youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and 
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and 
to psychological damage. . . . [M]inors often lack the experience, 
perspective, and judgment expected of adults.”76 Thus, by the very nature 
of her youth, a juvenile offender is less culpable than an adult offender for 
the same criminal action.
77
  
Subsequent cases largely echo this refrain. In Roper, the majority 
declares, “juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among 
the worst offenders.”78 For the Roper majority, the life circumstances of 
most juvenile criminals mitigate their culpability; the Court argued that 
juveniles are less blameworthy “for failing to escape negative influences in 
their whole environment.”79 Moreover, juveniles are more likely than 
adults to reform their behavior as they grow and mature.
80
 If juveniles are 
categorically less culpable, they should not be eligible for America’s 
harshest punishment.
81
  
Graham accepted Roper’s statements about juveniles in toto82 and 
applied Graham’s statements to the hazier case of LWOP for juveniles 
who did not kill. The Graham Court pointed out that “life without parole 
is the second most severe penalty permitted by law.”83 And unlike all other 
sentences except death, LWOP imposes “a forfeiture that is irrevocable.”84 
Weighing the criminal against the crime, the Court found that an offender 
 
 
 76. Id. at 834 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 77. Id. at 835. Justice Stevens reasons: “The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the 
privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally 
reprehensible as that of an adult.” Id. 
 78. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 79. Id. at 570. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. at 572–74. 
 82. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (“No recent data provide reason to 
reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles.”). Lerner takes issue with 
the Court’s interpretation of neurological data, suggesting that Justice Kennedy was looking for a 
“stud[y] indicat[ing] that juveniles are, in fact, fully mature, invulnerable to peer pressure, and in 
possession of characteristics etched in stone.” Lerner, supra note 18, at 330. 
 83. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (quoting from Harmelin v. Michigan 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 84. Id. 
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who is a juvenile, but not a killer, cannot be placed within the second-
worst class of offenders meriting the second harshest punishment.
85
 
The Court has also consistently asked whether any of the accepted 
rationales for punishment can justify a given sentence for the given class 
of criminals and crime. The analysis in Thompson, Atkins, and Roper 
focused on only two potential justifications: retribution and deterrence.
86
 
The Court in Gregg v. Georgia
87
 identified these justifications as the “two 
principal social purposes” of capital punishment.88 Thompson, Atkins, and 
Roper each found that retribution was an inappropriate justification for 
offenders with reduced culpability.
89
 Likewise, these cases found that 
deterrence does not justify the death penalty because the neurological 
differences between the offenders and able adults suggest that the former 
are less likely to consider the consequences of their actions in a way that 
gives the death penalty a true deterrent effect.
90
 
Because the sentence was LWOP, Graham presented the Court with a 
somewhat stickier situation than its previous juvenile sentencing cases. 
While the previous cases raised only justifications of retribution and 
deterrence, the realities of LWOP brought to bear theories of 
incapacitation and rehabilitation.
91
 The Court dispatched with retribution 
and deterrence as it had before.
92
 With regard to incapacitation, however, 
Justice Kennedy found that no sentencer could say with sufficient 
certainty that a juvenile non-homicide offender “would be a risk to society 
for the rest of his [or her] life.”93 Justice Kennedy’s language evokes the 
changeability of the juvenile character. Because juveniles are by definition 
works in progress, it is not possible to predict which children are 
 
 
 85. See id. (“[W]hen compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender . . . has a twice 
diminished moral culpability.”). 
 86. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570–72 (discussing penological rationales); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 318–320 (2002) (same); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836–38 (1988) (same). 
 87. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 88. Id. at 183. 
 89. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 836–37. 
 90. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571–72; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–20; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837–38. 
In Thompson, Justice Stevens states: “The likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of 
cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be 
virtually nonexistent.” Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837. Interestingly, Stevens also notes that the general 
reluctance to execute juveniles even where it was legal actually lessened the deterrent effect. See id. at 
838. This seems to have been the situation that spawned Roper. The offender in that case, Christopher 
Simmons, apparently told his accomplices that, as juveniles, they could “get away with [murder].” 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 556. 
 91. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010). 
 92. In these sections, the Graham Court cites Roper heavily before reaching precisely the same 
conclusion. Id. at 2028–29. 
 93. Id. at 2029. 
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permanently dangerous.
94
 Finally, the majority noted that LWOP 
“forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”95 Thus, while it is 
sometimes framed as a separate inquiry,
96
 the answer to the question of 
penological justifications is entirely determined by the Court’s initial 
conclusions about the fit between the culpability of the offender and the 
harshness of the crime. 
Since the Court decided Thompson twenty-five years ago, its notions of 
what it means to be a juvenile have expanded, but the fundamental 
message has gone unchanged. Juveniles, by definition, are not adults, and 
the reality of their lives and growth make it unfair to treat them exactly as 
if they were. 
III. MILLER V. ALABAMA: A DIFFERENT KIND OF DECENCY ANALYSIS 
In Miller v. Alabama,
97
 the Court held that the mandatory imposition of 
LWOP for crimes committed when an offender was 17 or younger 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
98
 The Court did not, however, 
ban juvenile LWOP outright.
99
 The Court reached its holding through a 
relatively simple analogy: life without parole is for a juvenile much of 
what a death sentence is for an adult, and consequently the two 
punishments should have some of the same requirements.
100
 The Miller 
decision is at once a natural extension of existing doctrines and a 
substantial analytical leap for an Eighth Amendment proportionality case. 
This Part illustrates such duality by sketching the Court’s decision and 
analyzing its fundamental reasoning.  
 
 
 94. Quoting himself in Roper, Justice Kennedy says: “These salient characteristics mean that ‘[i]t 
is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
irreparable corruption.’” Id. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573). 
 95. Id. at 2030. 
 96. For example, Justice Kennedy in Graham opens a paragraph by saying: “The penological 
justifications . . . are also relevant to the analysis.” Id. at 2028. 
 97. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 98. Id. at 2460. 
 99. Id. at 2469 (“Because that holding is sufficient to decide these cases, we do not consider 
Jackson’s and Miller’s alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on 
life without parole for juveniles, or at least for those 14 and younger.”). 
 100. Id. at 2463–64, 2466–67. 
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A. Crimes and Circumstances 
Miller consolidated two very different homicide cases
101
 and 
consequently involved two very different sets of facts. The petitioners, 
Kuntrell Jackson and Evan Miller, share the following characteristics: they 
are male,
102
 they committed homicide offenses when they were fourteen 
years old, they were tried as adults, and the trial court was given no other 
choice but to impose LWOP.
103
 Beyond these points, there is not much to 
bind Jackson and Miller, or their crimes, together. 
1. Kuntrell Jackson 
The Court presented Jackson’s case largely unadorned.104 When 
Kuntrell Jackson was fourteen he was involved with two older boys in an 
armed robbery that escalated into murder.
105
 While the older boys entered 
a video store meaning to rob it, Jackson initially remained outside.
106
 
Jackson entered the store as the older boys confronted the store clerk, one 
of them brandishing a sawed-off shotgun.
107
 The clerk threatened to call 
the authorities, prompting one of the older boys to shoot and kill her after 
which all three immediately fled.
108
 Using his statutory discretion,
109
 the 
 
 
 101. Miller consolidated a direct appeal, see Miller v. Alabama, 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 
2010), and a state petition for habeas corpus relief, see Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103 (Ark. 2011). 
 102. Although it has no direct Eighth Amendment significance, it is worth noting that every major 
sentencing case discussed in this Note involved a male offender. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461–62; 
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556 (2005); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 819 (1988). 
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in America, eighty-eight percent of all homicides are 
committed by males. James Alan Fox & Marianne W. Zawitz, Homicide Trends in the United States, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htius.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 
2013). 
 103. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461–63. 
 104. The Court neglected to provide any details regarding Jackson’s life experience. The record, 
while sparse in Jackson’s case, did include the detail that Jackson, his cousin, and the older boy, were 
walking through a housing project in small town Arkansas. See Brief for Petitioner., Jackson v. Hobbs, 
No. 10-9647, 2012 WL 92506, at *2 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2012); Respondent’s Brief in Opposition, Jackson v. 
Hobbs, No. 10-9647, 2011 WL 5373676 (U.S. June 1, 2011). According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 
Blytheville, Arkansas, where Jackson committed his offense, 39.1% of all families with children under 
eighteen live in poverty. American FactFinder, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2 
.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (search “Community Facts” for “Blytheville, Arkansas”; 
then follow “Income, Employment, Occupation, Commuting to Work . . .” hyperlink) (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2013). 
 105. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Arkansas authorizes prosecuting attorneys to charge fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds as adults 
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local prosecutor charged Jackson as an adult.
110
 The trial court convicted 
him of capital felony murder even though he was not the triggerman.
111
 In 
Arkansas, this offense carries a mandatory sentence of at least life without 
parole.
112
 
2. Evan Miller 
Compared with Jackson, Evan Miller’s case is more straightforward 
and is certainly more horrific, both in the narrative of the crime for which 
he was convicted and in Justice Kagan’s tragic account of his fractured 
home life. Drugs, alcohol, and physical abuse affected Miller’s 
childhood.
113
 His mother was an alcoholic and a drug addict, which caused 
Miller to bounce in and out of foster care.
114
 Eventually he began using 
drugs and alcohol himself.
115
 By the time he finished the first grade, Miller 
had already attempted suicide.
116
 
Miller met his victim as a consequence of his troubled upbringing; the 
victim approached his house to conduct a drug deal with Miller’s 
mother.
117
 After the deal, Miller and a friend drank and smoked marijuana 
with the soon-to-be victim.
118
 When the visitor passed out, Miller 
attempted to rob him, rousing him angrily from his stupor.
119
 Miller then 
sadistically beat him with a baseball bat he found and set fire to the trailer 
where they had been smoking. The victim remained incapacitated inside, 
and fire ultimately killed him.
120
 
Alabama law permits a prosecutor to request removal of a juvenile case 
to adult court, so long as the offender was at least fourteen.
121
 Because of 
 
 
under a limited list of extremely violent circumstances, including: “(A) Capital murder . . . , (B) 
Murder in the first degree . . . , (C) Kidnapping . . . , (D) Aggravated robbery . . . , (E) Rape . . . , (F) 
Battery in the first degree . . . , (G) Terroristic act.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(c)(2) (2009). The 
Supreme Court of Arkansas struck down an unrelated provision of § 9-27-318 in State v. A.G., 383 
S.W. 3d 317, 320 (Ark. 2011). 
 110. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. 
 111. Id. at 2468. 
 112. Id.; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104(b) (West 2013). 
 113. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. The victim died from a combination of blunt force trauma and asphyxiation. Id. 
 121. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-203(a) (2012). (formerly codified at § 12-15-34). Alabama 
comprehensively reorganized Title 12, Chapter 15 of the Alabama Code in 2008. See 2008 Ala. Acts 
277. 
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the cruelty of the killing,
122
 among other things, Miller’s case was 
transferred out of juvenile court.
123
 Tried as an adult, Miller was convicted 
of “murder in the course of arson.”124 Alabama’s sentencing statute, like 
the Arkansas statute in Jackson’s case, requires a minimum sentence of 
LWOP and makes no exception for juvenile offenders.
125
 
B. “Children Are Different, Too”: A Matter of ‘Life Is Death’ 
Justice Kagan’s opinion seems to regress when compared to Graham 
and Roper—the cases on which it most relies—opening with the Court’s 
independent judgment rather than objective consensus evidence. After 
affirming that the Court is indeed looking for “evolving standards of 
decency,”126 Justice Kagan explained that her decision would merge two 
separate lines of sentencing precedent to find mandatory juvenile LWOP 
unconstitutional.
127
 In Graham’s adoption of the death-penalty decency 
analysis for a juvenile LWOP case, Justice Kagan found license and 
motivation to directly apply the Court’s individualized sentencing 
requirement for death penalty cases
128
 under Woodson v. North Carolina
129
 
and Lockett v. Ohio.
130
 
Justice Kagan saw Graham and Roper as setting out a principle that 
children, merely by being children, “are constitutionally different from 
adults for the purposes of sentencing.”131 She noted that Graham’s 
conclusions about juvenile impulsivity, vulnerability, and changeability 
 
 
 122. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 
 123. Id. As Miller bludgeoned the victim, he proclaimed: “I am God, I’ve come to take your life.” 
Id. 
 124. Id. at 2462–63. 
 125. Id. at 2463; see also ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-40(9), 13A-6-2(c) (1982). 
 126. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. at 2463–64. 
 129. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 130. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
 131. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. Despite Justice Kagan’s language, it is more appropriate to refer to 
these offenders as “juveniles,” as opposed to “children.” Calling adolescents who kill “children” 
inadequately reflects the seriousness of homicide and has an unnecessary “polarizing effect on public 
discourse.” Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children are Different”: Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 11 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 72 n.5 (2013). Adolescents deserve lesser punishments not because of what 
they are, but what they are not. In my view, the Court’s recent juvenile sentencing cases do not create 
a separate Eighth Amendment for children, but simply enumerate circumstances where sentencers may 
not treat non-adults as adults. Cf. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (“[I]n imposing a State’s harshest 
penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as an adult.”). Failing to recognize this 
distinction lends undue credence to criticisms that the Court’s juvenile sentencing decisions are 
reductionist. 
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apply with equal force whether the crime is a homicide or not.
132
 Rather 
than stretch this conclusion to categorically bar all juvenile LWOP 
sentences, Justice Kagan found that “Graham insists that youth matters in 
determining the appropriateness of a lifetime incarceration without the 
possibility of parole.”133 When sentencing juveniles to our harshest 
punishments, she said, courts must consider that they are, in fact, 
sentencing juveniles.
134
  
Next, Justice Kagan built a bridge from Graham and Roper to the 
Court’s death-penalty precedents. Looking to Graham’s language about 
the similarities between juvenile LWOP and the death penalty,
135
 Justice 
Kagan noted that, because of the ages involved, LWOP entails the longest 
actual terms of incarceration when it is imposed on the young.
136
 She 
concluded: “In part because we viewed [LWOP] for juveniles as akin to 
the death penalty, we treated it similarly to that most severe 
punishment.”137 For the majority’s purposes, when a juvenile offender is 
involved, a life sentence is a death sentence. 
Given her analogy to the death penalty, Justice Kagan was able to point 
to Eighth Amendment principles forbidding mandatory imposition of the 
death penalty
138
 and requiring that courts consider “any mitigating factors, 
so that the death penalty is reserved only for the most culpable 
defendants.”139 The Court, she noted, has specifically required sentencers 
to consider youth and upbringing when deciding whether to impose the 
death penalty.
140
 Holding fast to the analogy between life and death, 
Justice Kagan concluded: “In meting out the death penalty, the elision of 
 
 
 132. See id. at 2465 (“Those features are evident in the same way, and to the same degree, when 
(as in both cases here) a botched robbery turns into a killing.”). 
 133. Id. at 2465. 
 134. Id. at 2466. 
 135. See supra text accompanying note 84. 
 136. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466. “[T]his lengthiest possible incarceration is an ‘especially harsh 
punishment for a juvenile,’ because he will almost inevitably serve ‘more years and a greater 
percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.’” Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2011, 2028 (2010)).  
 137. Id. To reinforce the analogy, Justice Kagan noted that, two years before Graham, the Court 
fashioned a similar death penalty rule in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), forbidding 
capital punishment for nonhomicide crimes against persons. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467.  
 138. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 139. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467. 
 140. Id.; see also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (“There is no dispute that a 
defendant’s youth is a relevant mitigating circumstance that must be within the effective reach of a 
capital sentencing jury . . . .”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982) (“[W]hen the 
defendant was 16 years old at the time of the offense there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent 
family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe emotional disturbance is particularly 
relevant.”). 
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all these differences would be strictly forbidden. . . . [A] similar rule 
should apply when a juvenile confronts a sentence of life (and death) in 
prison.”141 If death is indeed different, then so are juveniles.142 While 
mandatory LWOP for juveniles is impermissible,
143
 the majority refused to 
touch the question of whether all forms of juvenile LWOP were likewise 
unconstitutional.
144
 
C. The Demise of Objective Consensus Evidence? 
Several paragraphs after the Court announced its holding, the Miller 
Court finally turned to the objective prong of the “evolving standards of 
decency” calculus.145 Upon making the turn, the Court had to contend with 
the fact that mandatory LWOP is on the books in more than half of all 
states.
146
 The majority concluded that the unfavorable legislative head 
count did not impede its holding on two grounds. First, the Court 
explained that this holding was limited compared to prior cases—that is, it 
does not bar outright a particular form of punishment for a class of 
offenders, as Roper and Graham had.
147
 Second, because statutes 
transferring juveniles to adult court and statutes laying out mandatory 
sentences for those tried in adult court are independent from one another, 
the Court surmised that mandatory juvenile LWOP schemes might often 
be the product of inadvertent interaction between the two statutes.
148
 
Justices Roberts and Alito accused the majority of improperly ignoring 
legislative evidence and elevating its own, subjective opinion with 
language ranging from chiding to doom-saying. Justice Roberts claimed 
that the majority made a policy decision beyond its station.
149
 Justice 
Alito, for his part, claimed that the majority completely eliminated 
 
 
 141. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. 
 142. Id. at 2470. 
 143. Id. at 2469. 
 144. Id. Nor does it consider whether it might be cruel and unusual to ever impose LWOP on a 
juvenile non-triggerman, such as Jackson, prosecuted under the felony murder rule. Cf. id. at 2476 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (“But in my opinion, this type of ‘transferred intent’ is not sufficient to satisfy 
the intent to murder that could subject a juvenile to a sentence of life without parole.”). 
 145. See id. at 2469–71 (majority opinion). 
 146. Id. at 2471. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. at 2473. Justice Roberts takes issue with what he calls “assum[ing] a legislature is so 
ignorant of its own laws that it does not understand that two of them interact with each other.” Id. at 
2479–80 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 149. See id. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justice Roberts writes: “Perhaps science and 
policy suggest society should show greater mercy to young killers, giving them a greater chance to 
reform themselves at the risk that they will kill again. But that is not our decision to make.” Id. 
(internal citations omitted). 
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consideration of objective standards: “What today’s decision shows is that 
our Eighth Amendment cases are no longer tied to any objective indicia of 
society’s standards. Our Eighth Amendment case law is now entirely 
inward looking.”150 
Justice Alito’s conclusion is premature, as Miller’s holding is 
intentionally much narrower than its predecessors, suggesting that perhaps 
the majority was reluctant to go further without more legislative evidence. 
At the same time, the decision does evince willingness on the Court’s part 
to build some Eighth Amendment decisions predominantly on its 
independent judgment, rather than to begin every decency calculation with 
a formulaic census of the state legislatures. 
IV. THE (ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL) ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS 
Regarding the United States’ harshest juvenile penalties, the 
international community speaks with one clear, disapproving voice. 
Controversially,
151
 in its juvenile sentencing cases, the Court has generally 
tried to listen. Graham, Roper, and their predecessors all gave at least 
passing consideration to international standards as part of the Eighth 
Amendment decency calculus.
152
 Until Miller, that is. For reasons they did 
 
 
 150. See id. at 2490 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 151. Justice Scalia, for one, vehemently maintains that international considerations are totally 
irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment. In Roper, for example, he admonishes the Court: 
The Court should either profess its willingness to reconsider all of these matters in light of the 
views of foreigners, or else it should cease putting forth foreigners’ views as part of the 
reasoned basis of its decisions. To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, 
and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry. 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).  
 Jonathan Levy likewise tacitly accuses the Court of arbitrary application of international 
principles in its juvenile sentencing cases for subjective reasons. See Jonathan Levy, Recent 
Development, The Case of the Missing Argument: The Mysterious Disappearance of International 
Law from Juvenile Sentencing in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 355 (2013). Levy’s criticism, like Justice Scalia’s, seems to be rooted in the presumption that 
the United States does not, barring the whims of its jurists, have to honor and play by the world’s rules 
when its lawmakers do not wish it. Cf. id. at 358 (“Without a constitutional mandate to consider 
international law in interpreting the Eighth Amendment, the decision to do so is questionable policy.”). 
In other words, Levy criticizes courts for adhering to a policy of considering law. 
 152. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court briefly surveys Western, industrialized nations to find 
that their conclusions about the juvenile death penalty and the Court’s are “consistent.” 487 U.S. 815, 
830 (1988). Even Atkins v. Virginia, which otherwise ignores international materials, gives brief 
credence in a footnote to buttress its findings of national consensus. See 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) 
(“Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by 
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”). Roper and Graham also make 
comparatively extensive reference to international materials. See generally infra text accompanying 
notes 154–66. 
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not disclose, many of the same justices who sought out international 
opinion in previous cases
153
 chose to fix their gaze for Miller firmly within 
U.S. borders. This may be because Graham—the case on which Miller 
most relies—already considered the world community’s take on juvenile 
LWOP.
154
 Or it may be because the Court wanted to avoid the appearance 
of directly subjugating domestic legislative determinations to international 
law and opinion.
155
 Whatever the reason, Miller ignored the international 
angle, which had become an important part of the Court’s juvenile 
sentencing discussion. This Part discusses how the Court has used 
international law in previous juvenile sentencing cases, and argues that 
those materials evidence a binding international norm against juvenile 
LWOP punishments. 
A. International Consensus in Roper and Graham 
Both Roper and Graham claim to use evidence of global consensus to 
verify the Court’s already-reached conclusions about what punishments 
are cruel and unusual.
156
 Accordingly, in both cases the majority discusses 
international materials in the closing section of its opinion. 
In Roper, Justice Kennedy observed that, prior to the Court’s holding, 
“the United States is the only country in the world . . . to give official 
sanction to the juvenile penalty.”157 He noted that the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child,
158
 ratified by every state except the 
United States and Somalia, explicitly forbids imposing the death penalty 
 
 
   In fact, the Court has looked to international standards for as long as it has looked for “evolving 
standards of decency.” In Trop v. Dulles, the Court observed: “The United Nations’ survey of the 
nationality laws of 84 nations of the world reveals that only two countries . . . impose denationalization 
as a penalty for desertion.” 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 153. See discussion accompanying supra note 152. 
 154. Cf. Levy, supra note 151, at 372 (arguing that Miller was not “devoid of international law” 
because it relied on cases that considered it). See generally Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033–
34 (2010) (discussing international consensus against juvenile LWOP punishments). 
 155. In Roper, Justice Scalia had complained: “Though the views of our own citizens are 
essentially irrelevant to the Court’s decision today, the views of other countries and the so-called 
international community take center stage.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 622. 
 156. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034 (“The Court has treated the laws and practices of other 
nations and international agreements as relevant to the Eighth Amendment . . . because the judgment 
of the world’s nations that a particular sentencing practice is inconsistent with basic principles of 
decency demonstrates that the Court’s rationale has respected reasoning to support it.”); Roper, 543 
U.S. at 578 (majority opinion) (“The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our 
outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”). 
 157. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575. 
 158. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter CRC]. 
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for crimes committed when the offender was younger than eighteen.
159
 
Next, Justice Kennedy counted the number of other states that, in practice 
had, executed a juvenile between 1990 and 2005.
160
 He found seven—all 
of whom had since abandoned the punishment.
161
 Justice Kennedy then 
turned to English law, noting “the Amendment was modeled on a parallel 
provision in the English Declaration of Rights of 1689,” and observed that 
the United Kingdom had abolished the juvenile death penalty more than 
seventy years prior.
162
 Despite a relatively thorough discussion, Justice 
Kennedy made no mention of a potential, binding jus cogens norm against 
the punishment.
163
 
Graham’s treatment of international materials largely mimics Roper’s. 
In Graham, the Court found that of the eleven states that officially 
sanctioned juvenile LWOP, only the United States and Israel ever imposed 
it, and only the United States for non-homicide crimes.
164
 The Court again 
observed that the United States continued to be one of only two nations 
not to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
165
 Unlike Roper, 
the Court took a definitive stand on the jus cogens question. Admitting 
that the Court had been briefed on the issue, Justice Kennedy wrote: “[t]he 
debate . . . over whether there is a binding jus cogens norm against this 
sentencing practice is likewise of no import.”166 The Court simply will not 
touch binding rules of international law.  
 
 
 159. Roper, 543 U.S. at 576. Article 37 of the CRC provides: “No child shall be subjected to 
torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor 
life imprisonment without the possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by 
persons below eighteen years of age.” CRC, art. 37(a), 1577 U.N.T.S. at 55. 
 160. Roper, 543 U.S. at 577. 
 161. Id. Justice Kennedy writes: “In sum, it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone 
in a world that has turned . . . against the juvenile death penalty.” Id. 
 162. Id. Justice Scalia takes special exception to the Court’s discussion of English law, calling it 
“perhaps the most indefensible part of [the] opinion.” Id. at 626 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 163. This is noteworthy because, in 2002, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
issued a report concluding that, by sentencing minors to death, the United States was actively violating 
a jus cogens norm of international law. See Michael Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 62/02 ¶ 112 (2002), http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/usa. 
12285.htm. 
 164. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010). The Court noted that Israel technically 
allows juveniles sentenced to life a chance at parole, but with questionable process. Id. For the sake of 
argument, the Court assumes that Israel allows juvenile LWOP. Id. 
 165. See id. at 2034; see also supra text accompanying note 159. 
 166. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. 
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B. Dispositive International Consensus Against Juvenile LWOP Sentences 
The Supreme Court does not look for any binding law when it enquires 
into “the climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a 
particular punishment.”167 In Graham, Justice Kennedy insisted that “[t]he 
question . . . is not whether international law prohibits . . . the sentence at 
issue.”168 In declining to ask that question, the Court has failed to use an 
overwhelming source of objective consensus evidence—the all-but-
unanimous condemnation of juvenile LWOP the world over
169—to its full 
potential. This missed opportunity is all the more frustrating when one 
considers that the very international law sources the Court uses 
persuasively in its juvenile sentencing decisions, when examined closely, 
actually establish binding rules of international law. 
1. Custom and Jus Cogens Norms 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”), acknowledged in 
both Graham and Roper,
170
 absolutely forbids LWOP sentences from 
being imposed as punishment for crimes committed by those younger than 
eighteen.
171
 While the United States has not ratified it,
172
 the Convention 
may be nonetheless applicable in the United States if it constitutes an 
expression of international custom.
173
 In the Paquete Habana
174
 more than 
a century ago, the Supreme Court agreed that international custom is 
binding U.S. law in and of itself.
175
 Connie de la Vega and Michelle 
Leighton assert that the CRC “codifies an international customary norm of 
human rights.”176 
 
 
 167. Id. at 2033 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982). 
 168. Id. at 2034. 
 169. See, e.g., Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in Prison: 
Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 989 (2008) (observing that, as of 2008, “a single 
country is now responsible for 100% of all child offenders serving [LWOP]: the United States”). 
Notably, the Graham Court cited de la Vega and Leighton’s work. 
 170. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005). 
 171. CRC art. 37, 1577 U.N.T.S. at 55. 
 172. In Roper, Justice Scalia compares the Court’s reference to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child to judicial ratification of a treaty. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 173. See de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 169, at 1014 (“Once a rule of customary international 
law is established, that rule generally applies to all nations, including those that have not formally 
ratified it themselves.”) 
 174. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
 175. See id. at 700. The Court writes: “International law is part of our law. . . . [W]here there is no 
treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the 
customs and usages of civilized nations.” Id. 
 176. de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 169, at 1009. 
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De la Vega, Leighton, and others go a step further, arguing that the 
norm against juvenile LWOP has become jus cogens.
177
 A jus cogens 
norm differs from an ordinary norm of international law in that it is 
absolutely non-derogable.
178
 Whereas states can avoid international 
custom by persistently objecting,
179
 no state can escape a norm that is jus 
cogens.
180
 For an international custom to be jus cogens, the vast majority 
of states must recognize the norm as something that is inviolable.
181
  
Graham suggests that this “vast majority” has taken a stand against 
juvenile LWOP. In that case, Justice Kennedy noted that “the United 
States now stands alone” in imposing these sentences.182 Ratification of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child by every other nation except 
Somalia, suggests that the world community intends itself to be bound in 
its condemnation of juvenile LWOP.
183
 
2. First-party Treaty Obligations 
Commentators also point to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights
184
 (“ICCPR”) as a binding international law that forbids 
current U.S. juvenile sentencing practices.
185
 The ICCPR is different from 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, however, because the United 
States is a party to the treaty.
186
 
 
 
 177. See de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 169, at 1014–18; see also Tera Agyepong, Note, 
Children Left Behind Bars: Sullivan, Graham, and Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentences, 9 NW. U. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 83, 96–97 (2010), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v9/ 
n1/4/Agyepong.pdf. 
 178. Recognized jus cogens norms include the norms against piracy, slavery, and torture. M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 63, 68. 
 179. See Michael Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
62/02 ¶ 48–49 (2002); de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 169, at 1014 n.161.  
 180. See Domingues, Report No. 62/02 ¶ 85 (“The [jus cogens] norm cannot be validly derogated 
from, whether by treaty or by the objection of a state, persistent or otherwise.”). 
 181. Id. ¶ 50. The Commission notes that a jus cogens norm can arise “where there is acceptance 
or recognition by a large majority of states, even if over dissent by a small number of states.” Id. 
 182. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
 183. Cf. de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 169, at 1015–16. De la Vega & Leighton also note 
that the United States did not impose LWOP sentences on juveniles with any regularity until the past 
few decades. Id. at 1016. 
 184. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. No. 95-
20 (1992), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The ICCPR functions, along with other documents, 
as a sort of international bill of rights, and was “the first document to formally address juvenile rights 
in judicial proceedings.” Magnuson, supra note 16, at 168. 
 185. See, e.g., de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 169, at 1010–11 (arguing that the United States 
has violated its own treaty obligations under the ICCPR). 
 186. Id. at 1010. 
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Article 7 of the ICCPR forbids “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.”187 Article 10 requires that juveniles not be housed in adult 
prisons and that incarceration systems embrace rehabilitation as their 
primary purpose.
188
 Finally, Article 14(4) demands that juvenile 
sentencing “take [into] account . . . [the juvenile’s] age and the desirability 
of promoting their rehabilitation.”189 Several commentators have argued 
that, by sentencing juveniles to LWOP (eschewing rehabilitation) in adult 
prisons, the United States has violated its obligations under the ICCPR.
190
 
When it ratified the ICCPR in 1992, the United States included a 
reservation permitting it to treat juveniles as adults in “exceptional 
circumstances.”191 In practice, the U.S. does not honor its reservation. 
“Exceptional circumstances” apparently means “all the time,” as U.S. 
ratification of the treaty coincides with an increase in the number of 
juveniles sentenced to life without parole.
192
 Moreover, Marina Ann 
Magnuson argues that the U.S. reservation must be stricken because it 
conflicts with the treaty’s object and purpose.193 In that case, in imposing 
juvenile LWOP at all, the United States violates its first-party treaty 
obligations. 
In having nothing to do with binding rules of international law, the 
Court’s juvenile sentencing opinions have missed out on a potent source of 
consensus evidence for the Court’s Eighth Amendment calculus, and one 
that would have supported a comprehensive juvenile LWOP ban in 
Graham or Miller. Instead, the Court appears to be unable or unwilling to 
shake its persistent skepticism about, and occasional outright hostility to, 
 
 
 187. ICCPR, art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175. 
 188. See Art. 10(c), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176 (“The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of 
prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation. Juvenile 
offenders shall be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal 
status.” Id.). 
 189. Art. 14(4), 999 U.N.T.S. at 177. 
 190. See Magnuson, supra note 16, at 179–83; see also de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 169, at 
1011 (noting that, in 2006, the Committee on Human Rights found that U.S. sentencing practice 
violated its treaty obligations). 
 191. de la Vega & Leighton, supra note 169, at 1010. 
 192. See id. at 1010–11 (“The extraordinary breadth and rapid development in the United States of 
sentencing child offenders to LWOP since the United States’ ratification of the ICCPR contradicts the 
assertion that the United States has applied this sentence only in exceptional circumstances.”). 
 193. See Magnuson, supra note 16, at 178–79. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, states ratifying a treaty may not make a reservation that is “incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the treaty.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19(c), 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 336–37. While not a party to the Vienna Convention, the United States recognizes much 
of the treaty as customary international law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
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enforcing rules of international law,
194
 and the United States’s youths are 
worse off for it. 
V. IS MILLER A LAUNCHING PAD OR A ROAD BLOCK? 
From the advocate’s perspective, Miller’s holding is a significant step 
in the right direction.
195
 If courts, legislatures, and law enforcement 
officials take to heart the notion that juveniles have inherently lessened 
culpability, individualized sentencing may indeed make juvenile LWOP 
sentences “uncommon.”196 Moreover, Miller may serve as a springboard 
for applying more death-penalty protections to juvenile LWOP. Finally, 
Miller’s retroactive application could mean more humane and equitable 
treatment for many of the prisoners still serving LWOP sentences for 
juvenile actions.  
Yet Miller falls unsatisfyingly short of a total prohibition of juvenile 
LWOP.
197
 The decision represents a positive change, but that change may 
come with a price tag. By relying primarily on death penalty principles, 
rather than objective evidence, the Court created an analytical 
vulnerability that impedes a comprehensive juvenile LWOP ban for some 
years. Justice Kagan’s language and the majority’s limited holding suggest 
that the Court would not use its independent judgment to erect a full bar to 
juvenile LWOP sentences in the face of legislative evidence even more 
imposing than it saw in Miller.
198
 And by analogizing juvenile LWOP to 
the death penalty, the Court indicated that the constitutionality of those 
 
 
 194. See generally Robert Shawn Hogue, Medellín v. Texas: The Roberts Court and New 
Frontiers for Federalism, 41 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 255, 287 (noting that “the Roberts Court 
has, and will likely continue, to devolve power from the national government over to the states at the 
expense of not only the federal government but the international community as well.”). 
 195. For example, Executive Director Bryan Stevenson of the Equal Justice Institute, which 
represented both Evan Miller and Kuntrell Jackson, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) 
(syllabus), hailed the Court’s holding as “an important win for children” and “a significant step 
forward.” U.S. Supreme Court Bans Mandatory Life-Without-Parole Sentences for Children Convicted 
of Homicide, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (June 25, 2012), http://eji.org/node/646. 
 196. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (2012). But see Berkheiser, supra note 16, at 490 (“History has 
shown, however, that the individualized consideration now required before sentencing our youth to 
death in prison is no friend to youth.”). 
 197. Cf., e.g., Brian Evans, Victory: No More Mandatory Life Sentences for Children In US, 
AMNESTY INT’L HUM. RTS. NOW BLOG (June 25, 2012, 12:37 PM), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/us/ 
victory-no-more-mandatory-life-sentences-for-children-in-us/ (remarking that, while “a welcome step 
forward,” Miller is not the full juvenile LWOP ban America needs). 
 198. According to the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, thirty-eight states presently 
have inmates serving LWOP sentences for crimes committed as minors. State by State, THE 
CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, http://www.endjlwop.org/the-issue/stats-by-state/ 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2013). 
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two punishments may be linked such that, so long as states may execute 
the adult killer, they may throw away the key to the juvenile killer’s cell. 
Finally, although international law would provide an objective basis to 
support prohibition under a traditional decency analysis, the Court seems 
unlikely to go down that path. Therefore, this final Part concludes that 
litigation directly aimed at erecting a flat, federal bar against juvenile 
LWOP is unlikely to be successful and that the most effective strategy for 
advocates is to focus on more incremental action. 
A. The Limits of Independent Judgment 
While Justice Alito’s claim that, post-Miller, “Eighth Amendment 
cases are no longer tied to any objective indicia of society’s standards”199 
at best jumps the gun, his comment highlights an important point. That is, 
Justice Kagan’s majority opinion, by the simple fact of its organization, 
privileges the Court’s independent judgment much more overtly than 
Graham and Roper do.
200
 Those cases suggest that the Court’s 
independent judgment can sometimes override a lack of legislative 
consensus against a punishment, if the circumstances are right.
201
 But 
neither Graham nor Roper dared to suggest that legislative enactments 
can, at times, be effectively irrelevant to Eighth Amendment decency 
determinations.
202
 
But where Justices Roberts and Alito see the beginning of a perilous 
journey,
203
 the Court’s own language suggests that it probably lacks the 
will to oppose sweeping legislative disapproval to reach that journey’s 
immediate Promised Land—a categorical bar against all juvenile LWOP 
sentences. The Miller Court emphasized that substantial legislative 
authorization of juvenile LWOP sentences does not bar the majority’s 
holding in part because that holding added red tape to the imposition of an 
otherwise constitutional sentence instead of striking down an entire field 
 
 
 199. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2490 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying note 150. 
 200. Recall that Miller only addresses legislative enactments after announcing its holding. See 
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469–71; supra text accompanying note 126. 
 201. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (“Community consensus, while 
‘entitled to great weight,’ is not itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.”).  
 202. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 149–50. 
 203. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2481 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s opinion suggests 
that it is merely a way station on the path to further judicial displacement of the legislative role in 
proscribing appropriate punishment for crime.”); id. at 2490 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Unless our cases 
change course, we will continue to march toward some vision of evolutionary culmination that the 
Court has not yet disclosed.”). 
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of punishment.
204
 The Court, it appears, sees itself as taxing liquor rather 
than barring its consumption.  
The Miller Court all but admitted its reluctance to tackle juvenile 
LWOP head-on. Immediately after announcing her holding, Justice Kagan 
acknowledged that the Court had been briefed on whether “the Eighth 
Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, 
or at least for those 14 and younger.”205 By acknowledging the broad 
holding the Court could have reached, Justice Kagan underscored the 
narrowness of the one it chose.
206
 While Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Thomas viewed the Court’s expressed hope that juvenile LWOP sentences 
will be “uncommon”207 as laying the groundwork for further action by the 
Court, it can be characterized just as easily without that inherent self-
interest—a mere attempt to use persuasion to effectuate broader change 
than the Court is willing to find compelled by the Eighth Amendment.
208
 
B. The Downside of Life is Death 
The Court in Miller reached individualized sentencing for juveniles by 
applying death penalty rules to juvenile LWOP sentences.
209
 To bridge the 
gap, the Court drew a direct analogy between juvenile LWOP and the 
death penalty.
210
 The natural implications of that analogy—should it prove 
to have teeth—could stifle development of a categorical ban on juvenile 
LWOP under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 
To be sure, the Court never precisely stated that juvenile LWOP 
sentences are exactly the same as death sentences in Eighth Amendment 
 
 
 204. See id. at 2471 (majority opinion) (claiming that the Court’s holding “mandates only that a 
sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—
before imposing a particular penalty”). 
 205. Id. at 2469. 
 206. See id. Admittedly, the Court’s holding is not the narrowest possible under Miller’s facts. For 
example, the Court could have limited application of its holding to only offenders fourteen or younger, 
to only those convicted under a theory of felony-murder, see discussion supra note 144 (describing 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence), or a combination of the two. 
 207. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
 208. Justice Roberts suspects the Court is trying to give lower courts a basis to strike down 
juvenile LWOP sentences so that, at some point in the future, the sentences are rare enough that the 
reduced number of states authorizing the punishment can support a categorical bar à la Graham and 
Roper. See id. at 2481 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); cf. id. at 2486 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Elizabeth S. 
Scott gives these suspicions conditional credence: “This scenario is plausible, although whether the 
court’s warning will have the influence that the dissenters feared depends in part on whether 
lawmakers embrace the broader lessons for juvenile crime regulation embraced in these opinions . . . .” 
Scott, supra note 131, at 11. 
 209. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467. 
 210. See id. at 2466–67. 
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terms. Yet, when Justice Kagan wrote that life for children is “akin to the 
death penalty,” she seems to have meant it with some force.211 The 
analogy, she emphasized, was potent enough to permit the Graham Court 
to apply death penalty rules “in a way unprecedented for a term of 
imprisonment.”212 She also pointed out that Graham’s holding was 
essentially the juvenile LWOP equivalent of Kennedy v. Louisiana, where 
the Court found capital punishment for non-homicides categorically cruel 
and unusual.
213
 
The Court’s description of its own analytical framework suggests that 
the life-death analogy will not be a passing fad. The Court explained that 
its holding flowed from the “confluence” of the Court’s juvenile 
sentencing and death penalty precedent.
214
 Like two rivers that come 
together at a confluence, the Court suggested that from this point on, 
juvenile LWOP and death penalty precedent have more or less combined 
into one stream. 
Assuming the Court does indeed mean to latch on to its life-death 
analogy for the long haul, Miller could mean that the constitutionality of 
juvenile LWOP sentences hinges on the constitutionality of the death 
penalty itself. Whatever its wisdom, capital punishment remains 
constitutional and, although its popularity is falling, a significant majority 
of Americans continue to support its imposition.
215
 Miller may well mean 
that, so long as the death penalty remains an available punishment, 
juvenile LWOP will mean no categorical Eighth Amendment ban. 
Finally, the Court’s life-death analogy could impede the eventual 
development of robust proportionality review for juveniles and adults. 
When Justice Kagan defended the Court’s holding by saying that “children 
are different,”216 she opened up arguments that the rules of Miller and 
Graham will operate as rules specific to juveniles, just as cases like 
 
 
 211. Id. at 2466. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See id. at 2467; see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) 
 214. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. The Court writes: “Here, the confluence of these two lines of 
precedent leads to the conclusion that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violates 
the Eighth Amendment.” Id. 
 215. A recent Gallup poll found that sixty-three percent of Americans said they were “in favor of 
the death penalty for a person convicted of murder.” Lydia Saad, U.S. Death Penalty Support Stable at 
63%, GALLUP.COM (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/159770/death-penalty-support-stable 
.aspx. This represents a slight increase from the previous year, when public support hit a modern low. 
See Frank Newport, In U.S., Support for Death Penalty Falls to 39-Year Low, GALLUP.COM. (Oct. 13, 
2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150089/support-death-penalty-falls-year-low.aspx (indicating that 
sixty-one percent of Americans supported the death penalty in 2011). Widespread public support for 
the death penalty peaked in the early 1990s at 80 percent. Id. 
 216. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470. 
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217
 have been specific to capital punishment. In 
other words, Miller could simply place cases involving juveniles on the 
death-penalty side of the traditional, bifurcated proportionality analysis, 
and leave general proportionality principles unchanged. In this eventuality, 
the “new” Eighth Amendment would be little more than a red herring. 
C. International Consensus: Low-Hanging Fruit, but Apparently 
Poisonous 
The most direct way to escape the Miller Court’s shortcomings would 
be to acknowledge the weighty, near-universal agreement across the globe 
that juveniles who commit crimes, even those who kill, should not be 
eligible for lifetime incarceration without the possibility of release.
218
 The 
Court could easily acknowledge that international consensus and, more 
importantly, rules of international law may provide evidence of “evolving 
standards of decency.” International indicia address accusations of over-
subjectivity on behalf of the Court
219
 because they are entirely objective 
evidence. One can count the number of countries forbidding a certain 
punishment just as easily as one can count the number of U.S. states—it 
just requires more fingers. Likewise, international consensus offers a 
rational means to move past the potentially stifling side of the Court’s life-
death analogy. Using international evidence, the Court could reach a 
comprehensive juvenile LWOP ban using the more traditional analysis it 
seems to prefer, all things being equal. More importantly, the Court could 
reach that decision yesterday. 
Yet, the Court seems unlikely go down that path. As it has expanded 
Eighth Amendment sentencing protections, the Court has kept its distance 
from binding international law,
220
 even making the semi-absurd contention 
that, even if a jus cogens norm against juvenile LWOP existed, it would 
not matter.
221
 Jus cogens norms, by their very nature, are absolutely 
binding;
222
 thus, to suggest that such norms do not matter is to say that 
they do not, and cannot, exist. For whatever reason, Miller neglected all 
international mention whatsoever.
223
 Even if the Court returns to its more 
 
 
 217. 428 U.S. 280, 303–05 (1976) (plurality opinion) (requiring an individualized inquiry before 
courts may impose the death penalty). 
 218. See supra text accompanying notes 171–83. 
 219. See supra text accompanying note 150. 
 220. See supra text accompanying notes 167–68. 
 221. See supra text accompanying note 166.  
 222. See supra text accompanying note 180. 
 223. See supra text accompanying notes 151–55. 
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inquisitive treatment of international law and opinion, there is little reason 
to think its persistent resistance to binding rules will dissipate any time in 
the near future. 
D. Viable Alternatives to an Unwilling Court 
If the Court proves unwilling to take the final step to forbid juvenile 
LWOP across the board, the same result might be achieved gradually, 
state-by-state, through judicial decisions and legislation. It remains to be 
seen how well state courts will adhere to the spirit of the Miller decision, 
but early results are mixed.
224
 Likewise, what many state legislatures will 
do with their now-unconstitutional sentencing statutes is unclear.
225
 If 
advocates can carve out incremental protections at the state level, their 
successes could help to build a national consensus a future Court might 
use in the Eighth Amendment decency calculus. 
Those advocating for elimination of juvenile LWOP might also find 
success in omnibus juvenile reform bills. A recent report by the Attorney 
General’s Task Force on Children Exposed to Violence recommended, 
among other things, wholesale changes to the way the United States treats 
 
 
 224. For example, state courts are split over whether Miller should means anything for prisoners 
still serving mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences. Despite the fact that the Miller Court applied its 
holding to Kuntrell Jackson’s collateral challenge, state courts disagree about the decision’s general 
retroactivity. See generally, e.g., Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 2013) (not retroactive); 
Jones v. State, No. 2009-CT-02033-SCT, 2013 WL 3756564 (Miss. July 18, 2013) (retroactive); State 
v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2013) (retroactive); People v. Williams, 982 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2012) (retroactive); People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (not retroactive); Geter 
v. State, 115 So. 3d 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (not retroactive). There is similar disagreement 
among the federal courts. Compare In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365 (11th Cir. 2013) (not retroactive) 
with Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 WL 364198 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013). 
 For the most part, courts finding Miller not to apply retroactively consider it a purely procedural 
case. See Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 326–30. To be sure, the Miller Court professes to require a new 
“process.” Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012). But a purely procedural view seems 
rather short-sighted—while Miller does deal with process, it also substantively restricts the power of 
government. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Case Means Courts 
Must Look at Mandatory Sentences, A.B.A. JOURNAL (Aug. 8, 2012, 7:30 AM), http://www.aba 
journal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_juvenile_life-without-parole_case_means_courts_must_look_at 
_sen/ (“[T]he Miller court [sic] did more than change procedures; it held that the government cannot 
constitutionally impose a punishment.”). 
 Retroactivity litigation could provide an opportunity for juvenile advocates to gain additional 
ground in the states. See, e.g., Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 121–22 (holding that Miller also applies to de 
facto LWOP sentences—term-of-years sentences that are so long as to span the offender’s entire life). 
 225. For a database, though perhaps slightly outdated, of state responses to Miller, see generally 
Life Without Parole for Juveniles: States and Courts Weigh In, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Aug. 26, 
2013), http://www.pewstates.org/research/data-visualizations/life-without-parole-for-juveniles-states-
and-courts-weigh-in-85899500114. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2013] JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE POST-MILLER 409 
 
 
 
 
children and teens accused and convicted of crimes.
226
 Influenced by 
Miller, one of these recommended changes was an end to harsh, adult 
criminal punishments for juveniles.
227
 Legislation aimed not just at more 
humane criminal punishments, but also improving options for 
rehabilitation in the juvenile system
228
 and providing more support to 
offenders particularly vulnerable to violence,
229
 might galvanize greater 
popular support. 
Finally, further litigation on juvenile LWOP issues short of a 
comprehensive ban might be successful, both in affording juveniles 
greater protections and in galvanizing support for an eventual ban. For 
example, challenging the imposition of LWOP on juveniles convicted as 
accessories to homicide or under the felony-murder doctrine could be a 
successful starting point.
230
 Justice Breyer endorsed this position in his 
concurring opinion in Miller.
231
 Advocates who choose to take this path 
should carefully consider how arguments rooted in death penalty 
precedent might further entrench the Court’s life-death analogy. They 
should avoid mechanically applying death penalty cases, instead arguing 
from the principles that underlay those cases. Lastly, regardless of whether 
death penalty law obtains, advocates might always remind their courts that 
an international consensus is out there, should those courts choose to use 
it. 
CONCLUSION 
Miller v. Alabama represents a substantial step towards a more humane 
system of juvenile criminal sentencing under the Eighth Amendment. 
Regrettably, its reasoning and limited holding force one to question 
whether a judicially mandated end to juvenile LWOP sentences is in the 
 
 
 226. See ATT’Y GEN.’S NAT’L TASK FORCE ON CHILDREN EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE, supra note 33, 
at 110–25.  
 227. See id. at 124 (“We should stop treating juvenile offenders as if they were adults, prosecuting 
them as adults in adult courts, incarcerating them as adults, and sentencing them to harsh punishments 
that ignore their capacity to grow.”). 
 228. See id. at 114–15. 
 229. See id. at 116–19. 
 230. For articles outlining these arguments, see generally Michael Anderson, Note, The Eighth 
Amendment and Juvenile LWOP: Applying the Tison Standard to Juvenile Peripheral Accomplices, 82 
MISS. L.J. SUPRA 329 (2013), available at http://mississippilawjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 
04/4_Anderson_Comment_FINAL.pdf; Mariko K. Shitama, Note, Bringing Our Children Back from 
the Land of Nod: Why the Eighth Amendment Forbids Condemning Juveniles to Die in Prison for 
Accessorial Felony Murder, 65 FLA. L. REV. 813 (2013) 
 231. See supra note 144 (discussing Justice Breyer’s take on juvenile LWOP for accessorial 
liability). 
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short-term cards. This does not mean that advocates for juvenile justice 
should cease pushing for such a categorical bar in litigation. But it does 
mean that they should temper their expectations about what constitutional 
claims are likely to accomplish. They should give added focus to 
pressuring legislators to take cues from the Court and Attorney General 
and enact reformed sentencing policies that fully acknowledge children’s 
diminished culpability and greater capacity for rehabilitation and growth. 
They should push for juvenile sentencing schemes that will bring the 
United States in line with international standards. And they should seek 
laws and rulings that forbid or discourage sentencers from throwing away 
the key. Advocates should not, however, expect the Supreme Court to 
come to the rescue in the interim. 
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